Private investment under macroeconomic adjustment in Morocco by Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Muller, Tobias
Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs
WORKING PAPERS
Macroeconomic  Adjustment
I  and  Growth









Fiscal stabilization, a consistent foreign debt policy, more in-
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A significant domestic counterpart of Morocco's  of capital, a more stringent credit policy, and
vigorous external adjustment in the eighties was  reduced public capital
a decline in fixed capital formation, of which the
private sector bore a sizable share.  They further conclude that fiscal stabiliza-
tion, a consistent foreign debt policy, more
Schmidt-Hebbel and Muller focus on the  investment in public infrastructure, and a refonn
causes of declining private investment and on the  of investment codes would increase private
policies required to reverse this trend.  Using an  investment and growth in Morocco.
eclectic framework, they econometrically
determnine  the main deterninants  of private  Moreover, reformn  of the financial sector -
investment in Morocco.  even if it would not necessarily increase total
resources available for investment - could
They conclude that the main causes of the  significal'y improve the efficiency of financial
decline of private investment in Morocco in the  intermediation and therefore the quality of
eighties were great uncertainty about policy  investment in Morocco.
(proxied by foreign debt), a rapid rise in the cost
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Morocco went through a major macroeconomic  and external adjustment  during the eighties,
drastically reducing its current account deficit, from 12.3% of GDP in 1981-82  to zero in 1988. The
domestic counterpart  of this adjustment  was a major increase in gross national saving, which rose from
14.9% of GDP in  1981-82 to 22.6%  in  1987-88, and a  significant decline in gross fixed capital
formation, from 26.7% to 20.2% during the same period.  This sizeable investment  decline  has serious
implications  for future growth.
An important  share of the adjustment  affort  was borne by the private sector. While private saving
increased from 20.8% of GDP in 1981-82  to 23.5% in 1987-88,  private fixed capital  formation dropped
from 19.2% to 16.2%.  Due to the huge real exchange rate depreciation  after 1980 - which supported
the external adjustment  -the levels and the decline in the constant-pricet  private investment  rate are even
more dramatic: it fell from 17% in 1981-82  to 13.4% in 1987-88.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main determinants  of private capital formation in
Morocco.'  This will help to derive implications  for policies supportive  of higher investment  efforts
required for a path of high and sustainable  growth.
Section  2 describes  the performance  of private  and public  investment  during 1970-1988. The next
section  presents a framework  for private investment,  reviews the evolution  of its main determinants,  and
presents econometric  estimates  of private investment  functions  covering the period 1970-1988. Section
A atimmari7p-  tho  mkin  findings and draws policv imnlications.
'An analysis  of private sector saving in Morocco is carried out in Schmidt-Hebbel  and Muiller
(1990).-2  -
2.  PRIVATE  AND PUBLIC  INVESTMENT  IN MOROCCO:
MEASUREMENT  PROBLEMS  AND BEHAVIORAL  PATTERN
This section reviews the evolution of private and public investment  rates during the last two
decades.  Assessing  Morocco's investment  record both over time and in comparison  to other countries
suggests patterns and puzzles which are analyzed  more systematically  in the following  section.
One word of caution is in order.  Due to limitations  of data availability  discussed at length in
Appendix  A, national  saving and total gross domestic investment  could only be broken down into two
sector categories:  general government' and private sector (including public enterprises).  In  the
following  pages, the words public and private refer to this particular breakdown,  e.g. public  sector capital
stock means government  sector capital stock. 3
2.1  Investment in Morocco and Other Highly Indebted  Countries
Investment  rates have shown large fluctuations  over the last two decades  in Morocco. Compared
to  12 other highly indebted countries (HICs)4, the evolution of Morocco's  investment rate shows
similarities, but also distinctive  features that raise questions  (see figure 2.1).
2General  governLment  is defined as the aggregate  of the central goverunent (budget  general,
budgets annexes, comptes  speciaux du tresor), local administrations,  public non profit organizations
(e.g. universities, hospitals), and the social security system.
"This  definition  of the private sector, encompassing  public enterprises, forces to be cautious in
drawing conclusions  from the data.  However, the variability in the investment  sample is large enough
not to depend too much on public enterprise investment,  which accounted  for only 28% of non-
government investment  in 1980-82. Appendix A discusses  some limited evidence on the evolution  of
"pure" private and public enterprise investment.
'The World Bank groups 17 countries as highly indebted countries. Private (and total)
investment  rates are published by Pfeffermann  and Madarassy (1989) for 12 of them, i.e. Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. When comparing  private investment  rates in the HICs with those for Morocco, one has to
bear in mind that the latter includes  public enterprise investment,  whereas the HICs data does not for
most countries. For this comparison  investment  rates at current prices are used for all countries.-3  -
The broad trends are similar:  an increase of the investment  rate until the late seventies and a
clear decline in the eighties with the outbreak  of the debt crisis. The differences  occur (i) between 1975
and 1977, when both total and private investment  rose to very high levels in Morocco, and (ii) after
1985, when investment  picked up in the other HICs, but not in Morocco.  However. in 1987 the ratio
of total investment  to GDP (at current prices) was still higher in Morocco than in the other HICs.
This simple comparison raises two questions with important  policy implications: why did the
private investment  rate fall in the eighties in Morocco, and why  did private investment  not respond earlier
to the new incentive  structure created  by structural reforms, as in other HICs-?
The following  paragraphs illustrate  and comment  on the historical evolution of investment  and
saving in Morocco, without trying to answer the questions raised above.  Some answers will be given
in the light of the econometric  results in sections  3 and 4.
2.2  Maior Trends in Investment-Saving  Balances
Two general observations  can be drawn from the recent evolution:
(i)  Private and public investment  seem  to be highly correlated (see Figure 2.1).  This cannot
be entirely explained  by the fact that private investment  includes public enterprises, as
the latter account for less than a third of non-government  investment. It may reflect a
strong complementarity  between public and private investment;  or  it can indicate that
v !nn^ "a  ,^">^v otrani.+v  nr%n,  %^  s  w-.  s;.  ,}+.s  .'-  U^  -0-A  U.,  4-.
specification  below.
Mhere are some indications,  such as investment  permits given to the manufacturing  sector,
that private industrial investment  has finally started to recover in Morocco in 1989.Figure 2.1
IPrivate  and Total Fixed-Capital Investment
in Morocco and 12 Highly Indebted Countries
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(ii)  Figure 2.2 illustrates  the current-price saving-investment  balance  for the economy6. It
shows that both the public and private sectors contributed to the significant external
adjustment  whic'l took place since the mid-eighties.
The evolution of investment  and saving rates should aiso be seen in the context of external
developments  and domestic economic  policy decisions.
In the early seventies  private investment  (fixed  capital formation)  and saving rates were relatively
low, about 10% and 16%, respectively. The 1973-74  oil and phosphate  price shocks led to a strong
increase in privatc saving, which was partially reversed thereafter.  However, private saving remained
during 1975-1981  at levels 5 percentage  points of GDP higher than those of the early seventies.
From 1975  to 1977 an unprecedented  boom in investment  rates occurred  due to the simultaneous
impact of three factors. First, the 1973-1977  five-year plan had already set ambitious  targets for public
investment.  Second, the sudden rise of phosphate  prices in 1974, as well as Morocco's claim on the
Western Sahara, led to an upward revision  of the investment  targets. Finally, the private investment  rate
more than doubled between 1973 and 1977.  The government deficit rose massively and the private
saving-investment  surplus shrunk.  Foreign saving therefore reached an all-time high of 15.7% of GDP
in 1977.
The following 1978-1980  three-year  plan aimed at reestablishing  macroeconomic  balances. The
gnyarnmPnt  deificit  was reduced and public and private investmnent  rates fell to 6% and  17% respectivelv.
Public investment  was slightly revived  in the first two years of the 1981-1985  plan, while public
saving deteriorated significantly. The ensuing  rise in the public deficit was reflected in a similar current
account deterioration which, in combination  with the 1982 intel.lational  debt crisis, led to Morocco's
6See also Table C.1 in the Appendix.Figure  2.2
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1983  balance  of payments  crisis. No longer being able to finance its current account  deficit, the country
implemented  a stabilization  program with assistance  from the IMF and the World Bank.  On the basis
of the IMF stand-by programs the government  obtained  successive  rescheduling  of its foreign debt.
The strong adjustment  effort carried out since 1983 combined expenditure-switching  measures
based mainly on devaluations  with fiscal expenditure-reducing  policies.  They resulted in continuous
improvements  in both public and current account deficits during 1982-88 --  Morocco, in fact, achieved
a slight current account surplus in 1988.  However, both private and public investment  levels bore a
significant  share of this adjustment  effort.
2.3  Constant-Price  Private Investmnent
When interpreting  the time series for the private investment  rate, one has to bear in mind the
importance  of the investment  deflator. The real depreciation  of the Dirham between 1980  and 1985  drove
a wedge between the GDP and the investment  deflator, reflecting the high share of imported goods in
investment. Thus the evolution  of private investment  appears in a different light whether it is evaluated
at current or constant  prices.  However, the relevant indicator  for measuring the increase in the capital
stock is the investment  rate measured at constant  prices.
Constar,t-price  private investment,  as illustrated  by figure 2.3, fell from 17% in 1981-82  to 13%
of GDP in 1988. In addition, machinery  and equipment  decreased  their share in total private investment,
from 43% (or 7.3% of GDP) in  1981-82 to 36%.-  (or 4.  vf  CDfl  mfO  19°  . .icd'  to  vh
conclusion  that productive investnent has fallen even more than total fixed capital formation in Morocco
during the 19°0s.Figure 2.3
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3.  THE BEHAVIOR  OF PRIVATE  INVESTMENT,  1970-1988
3.1  _A  Fram-w  JrkIQr  riyats Investment
The specification of the private investment  and saving functions will draw from the recent
empirical literature  on investment  behav.r  with appropriate  consideration  of the structural  features of the
Moroccan economy.  The relevant recent work on which the investment  specification will be based
includes  th,e  survey by Serven and Solimano  (1990)  and empirical  studies by Chhibber  and Shafik (1990),
Dailami (1990a, 1990b), Dailami  and Walton (1989), De Melo and Tybout (1990), Faini and De Melo
(1990),  Greene and  Villanueva  (1990), Kahn  and Reinhart  (1990),  Musalem  (1989),  Schmidt-Hebbel
(1987), and Solimano  (1989). Partic  ar emphasis  is given  to the role of public policy-related  variables,
as put forth by Easterly et al. (1989) and Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991). Among  them are direct
fiscal policy variables, such as taxes and public investment,  and financial  variables  such as interest rates
and credit flows.
The specification  of the investment  function is not derived from first principles. To reduce the
incidence of problems derived from spurious correlation and non-stationarity  of both dependent and
independent  variables, rates of GDP instead of absolute levels are specified for private fixed-capital
investment  (constant-pr.ice  private investment  as a fraction of constant-price  GDP) and all relevant right-
hand scale variables.
The framework for private investment  combines neoclassical  investment  determinants  (the user
cost of capital  and the marginal  product  of capital)  with borrowing constraints  (credit to the firms, foreign
resources), public infrastructure (reflecting public/private capital complementarity), and uncertainty
variables (the variances of output and the user cost of capital, and the foreign debt to output ratio).
The simultaneous  presence of financial  price (interest)  and quantity  variables  describes  a situation
of segmented credit markets where ceilings are imposed on certain categories of credit by the deposit
banks.  Export credits and loans extended by the specialized  financial institutions are exempt from the- 10  -
ceilings;  but these credits are not available  to all firms.  Due to partial financial  liberalization  during the
eighties, the relative importance of quantity constraints has probably diminished over time while the
relevance  of the user cost of capital has been increasing.'
In a highly indebted country undergoing  far-reaching structural reforms, uncertainty over the
sustainability  of the current policy framework is a major hindrance to private investment,  due to the
irreversibility of investment decisions. 8 Unlike risk linked to a  stochastic behavior of prices and
economic  activity, uncertainty  over economic  policy is not only perceived  on the basis of past variability
of these variables.  It arises in situations where economic policy is not credible or judged not to be
sustainable. In a recent paper, Rodrik (1989) shows that even small probabilities  of policy reversal in
a mod&l  with entry and exit costs for capital can deter private investment  by considerable  amounts.
The specification  used in this paper, in accordance  to the referred literature, considers  five groups
of  investment determinants: neoclassical and  Keynesian variables,  borrowing constraints, public
infrastructure,  uncertainty  variables, and relevant  lags. The generic form of the equation is the following,
with expected  signs of the partial derivatives  denoted below each variable:
'However, due to the small size of our sample  our application  will be restricted to fixed-
coefficients  estimations.
'For the role of uncertainty  in irreversible  investment  decisions  see Bertianke  (1983), Bertola
(1989), Bertola and Caballero (1990), Bizer and Sichel (1988), and Pindyck (1988, 1989).- 11  -
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The private fixed-capital  investment  to GDP ratio (IFJY)  in equation (I) depends in the first place
on two variables related to neoclassical/Keynesian  hypotheses. Investment  is affected  negatively  by the
user cost of capital (UCK) and positively  by the ratio between current and trend GDP levels (Y/YT).
The user cost of capital reflects the interest rate, relevant business taxes, tax credits and depreciation
allowances  as well as the replacement  cost of capital goods and its expected  rate of change 9. The ratio
of actual and trend GDP is a proxy for both the marginal product of capital (which together with UCK
represents  the traditional neoclassical  investment  determinants'~ and capacity utilization  (an investment
determinant in Keynesian  analyses)."
The flows of banking sector credit to private firms (FC), terms of trade (TT) and net foreign
disbursements  to firms (ND) are variables which represent the influence  of domestic and foreign credit
constraints to investment. An increase in any of them relaxes borrowing cninstraints  faed  hvy  nrivate
-°A  detauled  calculation  of the real user cost of capital tor Morocco, based on Faini and Pigato
(1989), is in Appendix  B.
'"he  reason for choosing as the relevant  neoclassical  variables the-  -r  cost of capital cum
marginal  product of capital specification  instead  of a proxy for Tobin's q, k aiat the latter would be
the ratio between the stock market index and the replacement  price of capital goods.  However,
Morocco has a very thin stock market, through which only an insignificant  proportion  of private
investment  is financed.
"The marginal  product of capital is a linear function  of the output/capital  ratio with a Cobb-Douglas
production  function.  If the capital stock is proportional  to trend output, then the ratio of actual to
twend  GDP is a good proxy for the marginal  product of capital.- 12 -
firms as a result of controlled  interest rates and regulations  on sectoral credit allocations,  widely  observed
in Moroccan  financial markets.
Public infrastructure, co,.munications and transport services are often underpriced with long
waiting  times and other administrative  measures  which inhibit  both efficient  use by the private sector and
lead to sub-optimal public investment  levels in these areas.  This contributes to rationing of public
services with very high urban land prices in areas which have access to the rationed public services.
Increased  availability  of public  services  through  higher public investment  raises the profitability  of private
investment. Crowding in of private investment  in response  to public investment  in infrastructure  (due
to complementarity  of private and public infrastructure  capital for private production) is captured by the
stock of public sector capital (KG)."
Two sources of risk and uncertainty  inhibiting  or postponing  private investment  can be identified.
One refers to the risk associated with economic variables that are important determinants  of private
investment,  such as GDP and the user cost of capital. This phenomenon  is captured in our specification
by the moving variances of GDP (VY) and the user cost (VUCK).
The other refers to the uncertainty  over potential  future policy reversals. In this case, uncertainty
is caused by low credibility of the current policy framework, which induces a postponement  of the
investment  decision.  We have approximated  this policy uncertainty by one variable which strongly
contributes to it, without  being its only determinant: the external debt to GDP ratio (D/Y). In addition
" 2As opposed to most other studies on private-public  investnent complementarity,  where
current-period  public investment  is specified to crowd in current-period  private investment,  here it is
the end-of-preceding  period public sector capital stock which potentially affects current period private
itv-itmen-t positively.- 13 -
and separately, this variable signals the negative 'debt overhang  effect" on private investment, due to
higher expected  future taxes required to service foreign debt payments."'
Finally, the one-period lagged investment  rate substitutes for all relevant lagged independent
variables, which affect current capital formation when capital installation  lags are present.
3.2  Major Private Investment  Determinants
This section describes  the historical  evolution of the major private investment  determinants  (see
section 4.1).  The data for all explanatory  variables  used in the estimations  can be found in Appendix  C.
The user cost of capital depends on the lending interest rate, depreciation allowances, the tax
regime, and the level and rate of change of the price of capital goods (See Appendix B).  An increase
in the current-period  price level has two opposite  effects on the user cost: it signals an expected  capital
gain and lowers the real user cost in the current period, whereas the higher level implies an increase in
the real price of capital goods.  The first effect prevails in the short run while the second is more
important  in the longer run.
The real cost of capital fell from 8% in 19. 0 to -8% in  1983.  Then it increased extremely
rapidly to more than 20% in 1986-1988. This evolution  is due to the conjunction  of several factors: (i)
the increase in nominal lending interest rates from 8% in 1970 to 14% in 1988, (ii) a slowdown in the
expected  growth rate of the price of investment  goods after 1983, reinforced by a reduction of import
tarifft  n  (iiin  A  reduction  of the business tax rate in the Tanver  region  in 1983.
The ratio of current to trend GDP is influenced, among other factors, by agricultural output,
which is very volatile  due to rain fluctuations  in Morocco. Therefore  the good harvests in 1986  and 1988
13A significant  negative  influence  of outstanding foreign debt on private investment  is
estimated for Brazil by Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990) and reflected  by debt-conversion  simulations  for the
same country by Schmidt-Hebbel  and Vatnick (1990).- 14 -
are represented  by peaks. Aggregate  demand has strong  transitory effects  on output: the spending boom
in the second half of the seventies  was reflected by high actual to trend GDP ratios.
Morocco is an important  phosphate rock and fertilizer exporter and imports all of its oil.  Its
terms of trade gains reached a maximum  of 4% of GDP in  1974/1975, when phosphate prices had
increased far more than oil prices.  The subsequent collapse of phosphate  prices brought the terms of
trade back to the initial level.  After a further deterioration until 1984/1985, the oil price decline
improved Morocco's terms of trade between 1986  and 1988.
Credit to the private sector had been growing steadily, from 15% of GDP in 1970 to 24-25% in
1983.  Tighter monetary policy after the foreign exchange  crisis has stabilized  the credit to GDP ratio
since then.
The government  capital  stock increased  from 50% of GDP in 1970 to almost 90% in 1981/1983.
As a consequence  of the reduction in government investment  during the stabilization  period, it decreased
to 75% of GDP in 1988.
The debt to GDP ratio, stable and low until 1975/1976,  increased  subsequently,  because  Morocco
had to finance its ambitious investment  program from foreign sources.  As described  in section 2.2, the
current account  deficit could  not be decisivelv  reduced  before 1985/1986. Consequently,  the debt to GDP
ratio grew until those years, starting a slight decline in 1987/1988.
3.3  Aggregate  Private Investment  Behavior
3.3.1  Estimation  Resglts
Linear forms for equation  (1) for aggregate  private investment  were estimated  for the Moroccan
economy  on annual  data covering  the 1970-1988  period. The empirical  results are presented  in table 3.1.
The small sample size forces caution in interpreting  these results.  No single best estimation  has
been selected, because of collinearity  arnong right-hand variables, which affects the significance  levels- 15 -
of individual  variables.  Equation 1.1 in table 3.1 presents the complete specification  comprising most
variables present in equation (1) above. Variable DU is a dummy  for the high-investment  period 1975-
1978, during which both private and public investment  reached abnormal  high values not accounted  for
by other determinants; during those years the rate of private investment  exceeded normal levels by 5
percentage points, as reflected  by the coefficient  of DU".
Equation 1.2 in table 3.1 is the two-stage  least squares (2SLS)  version of equation 1.1, specified
to instrumentalize  the lagged dependent variable. In both equations 1.1 and 1.2 the lagged endogenous
variable, net foreign disbursements  to  firms, and the variance of  the user cost of capital are not
individually significant at acceptable statistical levels.  Equations 1.3 and  1.4 omit in stages these
variables.  These three variables are also not jointly significant  as was inferred from the corresponding
F-tests.
The cost of capital and the government capital stock are not significant at acceptable  levels in
equations 1.1 - 1.4, which seemns  to be mostly a reflection of the high collinearity between these two
variables and the debt to GDP ratio.  In fact, when  deleting  the government  capital stock from equation
1.6, the user cost of capital is significant.  Although the negative influence of the cost of capital on
investment  has a low magnitude,  its effect on private capital formation  has probably been growing over
time, as rising interest rates have weakened  the influence  and extent of credit or quantity constraints.
Equations 1.4 - 1.6 show robust results for a number of investment  determinants".
'4There are clear indications  that public enterprise investment,  included in private investment,
was very important  during that period.
'5Because  of the above-mentioned  multicollinearity  between three important  variables, these
equations  should not be discussed separately. Taken on its own, one equation does not reflect well
the  influence  of all variables.- 16 -
TABLE  3.1
AGGREGATE  PRIVATE  INVESTMENT  (1Pm
(1970-1988)
Euation  C  UCK  YfYT  FCIY  TTfY  NDIY  KG/Y  VUCK  DY  DU  IP/Y(-I1  DW  R
2A  F
1.1.  LS  40.20  -0.05  0.24  0.82  0.38  0.31  0.09  -0.14  -0.18  0.05  -0.25  2.12  0.94  30.2
(-1.3)  (-0.9)  (1.7)  (2-4)  (1.7)  (1.1)  (0.8)  (-1.2)  (-2.1)  (3.7)  (-1.0)
1.2.  TSLSO  -0.24  -0.05  0.27  0.85  0.34  0.33  0.12  -0.14  -0.20  0.05  -0.35  2.29  0.94  29.7
(-1.4)  (-0.8)  (1.8)  (2.5)  (1.5)  (1.1)  (1.0)  (-1.3)  (-2.2)  (3.8)  (-1.2)
1.3.  LS  -0.14  -0.06  0.19  0.69  0.48  0.04  -0.11  -0.14  0.05  2.12  0.94  38.2
(-.7)  (-1.2)  (2.5)  (2.1)  (2.5)  (0.5)  (-1.0)  (-1.8)  (4.4)
1.4.  LS  -0.17  -0.06  0.22  0.67  0.53  0.04  -0.13  0.05  2.04  0.94  43.7
(-2.1)  (-1.2)  (3.1)  (2.1)  (2.8)  (0.5)  (-1.8)  (4.3)
1.5.  1S  -0.20  0.21  0.71  0.43  0.12  -0.19  0.04  1.67  0.94  49.1
(-2.6)  (2-9)  (2-2)  (2.5)  (2.3)  (-3.9)  (4.0)
1.6.  LS  -0.16  40.08  0.22  0.73  0.56  -0.11  0.05  2.19  0.95  54.4
(-2.1)  (-2.7)  (3.2)  (2.5)  (3.3)  (-1.8)  (4.4)
*IzitUMsgizad  vaidabl:  IUIY (-1).- 17 -
The degree of uncertainty and risk perceived  by private investors was related in our analysis  to
both the total stock of foreign debt outstanding  and the moving  variances  of the cost of capital and GDP,
The first variable represents both a proxy of the higher risk of future macroeconomic  instability and
relative price changes  and a signal  of higher expected  future taxes to service the debt.  Our results show
that the debt/GDP ratio is moderately  significant  in reducing  Morocco's investment  rate.  The magnitude
of its effect suggests  that for each 10% decline in the debt/GDP ratio the investment  rate could increase
by some 1.5 percentage  points - a result which should not be extrapolated  for major declines in debt-GDP
ratios. The other two measures  of risk, reflecting  the uncertainty  of the economic  environment,  were not
found to affect investment  rates."
The amount  of bank credit to firms plays an essential  role in an economy  whose financial  system
has been dominated  by credit ceilings and quantity  constraints, with interest rates playing a secondary,
although increasing, role in determining  financial resource allocation.  Not surprisingly, bank credit to
firms has been a statistically  and numerically important  determinant of private investment  in Morocco:
for every percentage point increase in the credit/GDP ratio, the investment  rate has increased by 0.7
percentage  points.  However, because of the relatively declining  role of credit constraints vis-a-vis the
cost of capital, this relation is probably smaller in the present.
Capacity  utilization  and the marginal  product  of capital  - both proxied by the ratio of current to
trend GDP - are significant  determinants  of private investment  in Morocco. This ratio, which reflects
the economy's  business cycle,  probably signals also the inflllenee nf an imnart2nt  financ.ing qnifret nf
private investment: retained profits, which are correlated  with the cycle. The magnitude  of the business
'61n fact, the results which include the variance of GDP are not presented in the table due to
the negligible  significance  of this variable.- 18 -
cycle effect on investment  is moderately high:  for every percentage  point gain of GDP relative to its
trend level, the investment  rate raises by 0.22 percentage  points."
Gains from terms of trade are an important  determinant of aggregate private investment, as
opposed to net disbursements  of foreign loans to the private sector.  The empirical evidence suggests  a
high magnitude  for this effect:  approximately  50 cts. of each dollar from terms of trade gains (losses)
increases  (reduces)  investment. This effect suggests  the importance  of either an overreaction  to transitory
commodity  price booms or the extent of foreign liquidity  constraints, or both.
Public infrastructure, communications and transport services are very scarce though often
underpri'ed in Morocco.  This contributes to the high price of urban and industrial land (when those
services are available), a major current constraint  on private investment  in the manufacturing  sector. In
our analysis  we proxied the availability  of infrastructure  and communications  by a measure of the capital
stock stemming from government investment. Although its significance  suggests some role played by
this constraint to private investment,  its magnitude  is quite small.
3.3.2.  Why did Investmen.  Fall in the Eighties? An Ex-post Simulation
A question with important implications for future growth prospects is:  why did the private
investment  rate decrease over the adjustment  period, from 17.2% in 1979-1980  to 13.3  % in 1986-1988?
The contribution  of different macroeconomic  variables to this decline can be analyzed  by decomposing
the change in investment  explained  by the estimated  investment  equations.
The methodology  for this decomposition  is straightforward.  We use the fitted equation of the
investment  rate and decompose  its change over a certain period into a sum of changes  due to variations
of its explanatory  variables.
'>his  and the subsequent  coefficients  mentioned  below correspond to equations 1.4 - 1.6 of
table 3. 1.- 19 -
In order  to get more  rbhust results'",  two different  investment equations,  1.5 and  1.6 of tahle
3.1,  are used for this decornposition. The fitted private investment  rates (shown in figure 3.1 for
equation 5.1)  match the actual series quite well.  Because of the estimation errors,  however, the
benchmark  for the period over which the decline  in the investment  rate is analyzed,  are taken as averages:
1979-1980  and 1986-1988.
Table  3.2  presents the decomposition of the  private investment decline according to  the
contribution  of its explanatory  variables.
Three variables played a significant role in the fall of th* private investment rate during the
1980s:  the debt to GDP ratio, the user cost of capital and the ratio of current to trend GDP.  The
influences of the first two variables reflect their trends, whereas the third variable is by definition
cyclical.  The increase of the debt to GDP ratio' 9 (from 47% in 1979/80 to 70% in 1986-88)  explains
over 70% of the drop in the investment  rate. Thus, growing uncertainty  on future policy reversals, and
higher expected  future  taxes as proxied  by the debt to GDP ratio, play an essential  role in the investment
decline observed during the eighties in Morocco. The sharp rise of the real user cost of capital from 0
to 24% over the same period may explain up to 50% of the investment  decline. The contribution  of the
current to trend GDP ratio depends very much on the choice of the beginning and end cf the period&
and should therefore not be overemphasized.
The influence  of the public capital stock and the terms of trade adjustment  is negligible  over the
perkd.  The ratio of the public capital stock to CGDP  is oniv sliphtlv lower in  1986-1988 (80%) than in
1979-1980  (b  %).  Likewise, there has been no significant  change in the terms of trade.
" 81n the presence of multicollinearity  between explanatory  variables (UCK, KG/Y, D/Y), the
contribution  of each of these variab!es cannot be clearly identified.
"TMhe  debt to GDP ratio is measured  at constant prices and exchange rate.
'In  1979 and 1980, GDP was above the 20-year trend, whereas on average 1986-1988  were
below, because of the negative  growth in 1987.Figure  3.1
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Table 3.2
CONTRIBUTION  OF EXPLANATORY  VARUMI3-.S  TO  1ljl.  DECLINE IN  _THE
PRIVATE  INVESTMENT  RATE BETWEEN 1979-1980  AND 1986-1988
Changes in Percentage  Points of GDP (changes  in % of Private Investment  Rate decline)
Based on  Based on
Equation 1.5  Equation 1.6
Foreign Debt/GDP (DI/Y)  -4.6% (120%)  -2.7% ( 70%)
User Cost of Capital (UCK)  -2.0% ( 51%)
Public Capital Stock (KG/Y)  -0.2% (6%)
Firm Credit/GDP (FC/Y)  1.9% (49%)  1.9% (-50%)
Current/Trend  GDP (Y/YT)  -1.5% (40%)  -1.6% (42%)
Terms of Trade Adiust.(TT/Y)  0.1% (-4%)  0.2% (-5%)
Unexplained  Variation  0.5% (-13%)  0.3% (-8%)
Private Investment/GDP  (IP/Y)  -3.8% (100%)  -3.8% (100%)- 22 -
The only variable that twnded  to incrW.ase  privatv investment  is dte availability  of credit to private
sector firms.  The ratio of credit to GDP increased  between 1979-1980  and 1983  frorr.  21  % to over 24%
and remained stable in the later years.  This increase would have accounted  for a rise in the private
investment  rate by 1.9 percentage  points of GDP.
3.4  Private Investment  Behavior  by Sectors of Origin
Let's turn now to the behavior  of private investment  by sectors of origin.  We concentrate  on the
two major components  of aggregate private investment: buildings (B) and machinery and equipment
(ME). Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the main empirical  results. The discussion  here will focus only on the
main differences between  these results and those related to aggregate investment  in table 3.1.
The role of the user cost of capital relative to the price of output 2'  seems to be weaker at the
sector than at the aggregate level.  Although its individual  significance level is hampered by strong
collinearity with other right-hand variables, its numerical influence is very low for both investment
categories.
An interesting  behavioral difference  between the two investment  categories is that construction
activity is procyclical, while ME investment  depends on the level of net foreign disbursements. This
difference  seems to be sensible  when considering  that B investment  includes  housing construction  (which
is strongly correlated with the cycle in most countries), while ME is correlated with investment in
manufacturing  and export sectors, which typically preser,ts a higher degree of foreign financing than
housing investment.
2'Ncte that the sector user cost of capital relative to the GDP deflator was constructed
separately for investment  and buildings  (UCKB) and investment  in machinery  and equipment
(UCKM), taking into conside;ation  the differences in taxes, depreciation  rates, and investment
defiators.  See Appendices  B and C.- 23 -
Domestic bank credit to firms and foreign terms of trade gains are significant and nurnzrically
important  determinants  of both investment  categories,  replicating  their influence  on aggregate  investment.
As at the aggregate  level, there is only weak evidence  for private sector investment  crowding in
from a more developed  public infrastructure. While there is no evidence  for the role of the public sector
capital stock in determining ME investment,  some influence  of this variable on B investment  is found.
Its  low magnitude suggests that  private housing and plant construction will expand modestly if
government  investment  is significantly  increased.
Finally, risk variables also play a similar role in determining investment  by categories and
aggregate investment. The variance of the cost of capital does not have a significant  role on private
investment  categories. However, uncertainty  about  future  economic  policy  and related  to high debt/output
levels  plays an important  role in determining  investment  in machinery  and equipment,  and a smaller role
in affecting  investment  in buildings.TABLE  3.3
PRIVATE  INVESTMENT:  BUILDINGS  (IPB/y
(1970-1988)
C  UCKB  TT/Y  ND/Y  KGIY  VUCKB D/Y  DiU  IPBIY(-I) DW  R 2A  F
2.1.  TSLS.  -0.07  0.002  0.06  0.27  0.10  -0.23  0.03  -0.07  -0.05  0.01  0.25  2.67  0.90  17.4
(40.7)  (0.1)  0.6)  (1.8)  (1.1)  (-1.9)  (0.7)  (-1.4)  (-1.4)  (2.9)  (0.5)
2.2. LS  -0.10  0.01  0.09  0.34  0.12  0.04  -0.07  0.01  1.97  0.88  70.3
(-2.8)  (0.3)  (2.8)  (2.4)  (1.4)  (1.2)  (-2.2)  (1.9)
2.3. IS  -0.10  0.08  0.33  0.13  0.03  -0.06  0.01  2.00  0.89  25.7
(-3.2)  (2.9)  (2.5)  (1.8)  (1.7  (-3.1)  (2.0)
2.4.  LS  -0.09  -0.02  0.08  0.39  0.16  -0.05  0.01  2.06  0.88  22.6
(-2.5)  (-1.1)  (2.7)  (2.9)  (2.0)  (-8)  (1.7)
*InUn3ga1ized viable:  IPB/Y(-1)TABLE  3.4
MRJVATE  INVESIWME *T:  MACHINERY  AND  EOUIPMENT  (IPM I)
(1970-1983)
£  UCKfo  XC  uIF  Y  lTT  ND/Y  KGfY  VUCKM  D/Y  DU  IPM/Y(-I)  DW  R 2A  F
3.1.  TSLS  -0.23  40.01  0.23  0.58  0.17  0.57  0.08  40.08  -0.17  0.04  -0.57  2.26  0.92  21.0
(-1.8)  (-0.5)  (1.9)  (1.9)  (0.8)  (2.1)  (0.8)  (-1.0)  (-2.9)  (2.4)  '-1.6)
3.2.  LS  -0.08  -0.02  0.09  0.70  0.40  0.61  -0.03  -0.14  0.02  1.79  0.91  23.2
(-1.0)  (-0.8)  (1.1)  (2.3)  (2.4)  (2.2)  (.05)  (-2.3)  (1.7)
3.3.  LS  40.10  0.08  0.71  0.35  0.60  0.01  -0.17  0.02  1.62  0.91  27.4
(-1.1)  (1.0)  (2.4)  (2.3)  (2.2)  (D.1)  (-3.6)  (1.6)
3.4.  LS  -0.09  -0.01  0.09  0.63  0.38  0.57  -0.15  0.02  1.75  0.91  28.4
(-1.1)  (.0.6)  (1.1)  (2.4)  (2.4)  (2.3)  (-2.6)  (1.8)
3.5.  LS  -0.01  0.73  0.31  0.76  -0.17  0.02  1.63  0.92  41.1
(40.6)  (3.5)  (2.1)  (3.9)  (4.1)  (1.9)
Ilnsuumst.Iized  varable:  (I/Y(-1)- 26 -
4.  CQNCLUSIONS  AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
lbis final section  summarizes  briefly  the maih.  findings  on the determinants  of private investment
in Morocco and draws the relevant  policy conclusions.
4.1  Main Findings
(i)  Domestic and private capital formation have shown very pronounced fluctuations  during the
seventies and eighties in Morocco.  After a period of relatively low investment rates in the early
seventies, an investment  boom raised domestic investment  rates to 37% of GDP (and private investment
rates to 24%) during 1975-1977. Subsequently,  investment  rates dropped to 23% of GDP and private
investment  rates to  17% during  9QV!813.  The decline in real domestic investment  rates to 17% and of
real private investment  rates to  13% of GDP in 1988 exceeds significantly  the reduction in nominal
investment  rates, due to the depreciation  of the real exchange  rate between 1980  and 1985, which raised
significantly  the price of capital goods relative  to the GDP deflator.
(ii)  Why did private investment  fall during the adjustment period in the eighties?  Our analysis
suggests  that growing uncertainty  on future economic  policy, as approximated  by the debt/output  ratio,
is the major factor contributing  to the investment  decline. The rapid rise of the user cost of capital also
seems to have driven down private investment. A more stringent credit policy and. to a lesser degree.
the deterioration of the public capital stock (relative to GDP) also contributed  to lower private capital
formation.
(iii)  Private investment  in Morocco is significantly  influenced  by the cost of capital, the expected
return on investment,  the level of aggregate  demand or capacity  utilization,  bank credit and the structure- 27 -
of  financial markets, terms of trade shocks, the availability of public sector capital services, and
uncertainty as reflected by the foreign debt/GDP ratio.  Table 4.1 reflects the influence of the most
important private investment determinants in Morocco, by  showing the required changes in these
determinants, each of which would increase the rate of private investment  by I percentage  point.
(iv)  The level of foreign debt outstanding  signals both the extent of the risk of future macroeconomic
instability and relative price changes when policy uncertainty is prevalent and the more direct debt
disincentive  effect  on investment  stemming  from the expectation  of higher future  taxes to service  the debt.
Our results show that the debt/GDP  ratio is moderately  significant  in reducing  Morocco's investment  rate.
(v)  The cost of capital relative to the price of output has increased significantly  during the eighties
in Morocco, due to a combination  of higher taxes on profits, the real exchange  rate depreciation, and the
increase in real interest rates as administered  nominal lending rates have been allowed to rise to levels
reaching 14% in 1988.  Although  the negative influence  of the cost of capital on investment  has a low
magnitude, its effect on private capital formation seems to be growing every year as rising interest rates
weaken  the influence  and extent of credit or quantity constraints.
(vi)  The amount of bank credit to firms plays an essential role in an economy  whose  financial  system
is dominated  by credit ceilings and quantity  constraints. with interest rates Wlaving  a secondarv.  although
increasing, role in determining  financial resource allocation. Not surprisingly, bank credit to firms has
been a statistically  and numerically  important  determinant  of private investment  in Morocco. However,
because of the relatively declining  role of credit constraints vis-a-vis the cost of capital, this relation is
probably smaller in the present.- 28 -
TABLE  4.1
CHANGES  IN INVESTMENT  DETERMINANTS
REOLIRED TO RAISE PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
To raise the private investment  rate by 5 percentage  points of GDP from the 1988  level of 13.3%
to 18.3%, which is slightly above the pre-adjustment  level in 1982, the combination  of the following
changes is required, each of them contributing  to a recovery by one percentage  point of GDP,:
*  A decline  in the external  debt/GDP ratio by 6.7 percentage  points (from 66.7% in 1988  to 60%),
*  A decline in the cost of capital  of 12.5%, or an incrt.ase  in the public capital stock/GDP  ratio by
8.3 percentage  points (from 76.3% in 1988  to 84.6%),
D  An increase in the bank credit/GDP ratio by 1.4 percentage points (from 23.7%  in 1988 to
25.1%),
- An increase in the current/trend GDP ratio by 4.7 percentage  points (from 99.2% to 103.9%),
A gain in the terms of trade GDP ratio of 2 percentage  points (from 1.1% in 1988  to 3.1%).
(vii)  CnmCitv  utiiHation  and the marginal  product of capi-al  b-th  proxi  b'  t,C ratio of currez  to
trend GDP - are significant  determinants  of private investment  in Morocco.  This ratio, which reflects
the economy's business cycle, probably signals also the influence  of an important  financing source of
private investment - retained profits - which are correlated  with the cycle.
2Calculated from the averages  of the coefficients  of equations 1.5 and 1.6 in Table 3.1.- 29 -
(viii)  Gains from terms of trade are an important determinant  of aggregate private investment,  as
opposed  to net disbursements  of foreign loans to the private sector. The former variable, which is often
mentioned  to have asymmetric  effects  on saving depending  on its sign, suggests  the importance  of either
an overreaction  to transitory commodity  price booms or the extent of foreign liquidity constraints, or
both.
(ix)  Public infrastructure, communications and transport services are very  scarce though often
underpriced  in Morocco. This contributes  to the high price of urban and industrial land, a major current
constraint on private investment  in the manufacturing  sector. In our analysis  we proxied the availability
of  infrastructure and  communications by  a  measure of  the  capital stock stemming from  public
infrastructure investment.  Although its significance suggests some role played by this constraint to
private investment, its magnitude  is quite small.
(x)  Some  differences with the results obtained for aggregate  investment  appear for investment  levels
disaggregated  by sectors of origin.  The role of the cost of capital is weaker at the sector than at the
aggregate level.  In general, construction invest ient (or investment  in buildings) resembles more the
results obtained for aggregate investment  than those corresponding to investment in machinery and
equipment do.  While investment in buildings is  influenced by the business cycle,  investment in
no1*;^o~  abnF  s^;"mnt  fA^nantic  rn  nat  fnrpiorn  Tlcn¢oo*  *n  Aj4;t;^nnUs;  GnXf*+actt"a  avar tc
some influence  on buildings  investment, while it does not contribute  to capital formation in machinery
and equipment.  The remaining variables (bank credit, terms of trade gains, and debt/output ratios)
influence  investment  by sectors of origin in a similar way to aggregate  private capital formation.- 30 -
4.2  Policy Implications
Various  policy lessons  can be drawn frotn our quantitative  and qualitative  assessment  of private
investment  behavior  in Morocco. They refer to fiscal  policies,  financial  sector  reform, public investment,
management  of terms of trade shocks, foreign debt policies, and foreign investment  policies.
1.  Public sector deficits have a strong negative impact on private capital formation in Morocco.
They crowd out financing  of private investment  both directly (by reducing residual  bank credit available
to firms) and indirectly via higher real interest rates.  A reduction of currently increasing  public sector
deficits is an essential prerequisite  for achieving  investment  levels required for sustainable  high growth.
rates.  However,  one should  take into account  that a more restrictive  fiscal policy would probably  induce
a recessionary  adjustment  period and a real exchange  rate depreciation,  both affecting  negatively  private
investment  during the adjustment  phase.
2.  The current structure of financial markets constitutes a  significant hindrance to an efficient
resource allocation, and probably also affects the aggregate  level of private investment. Elimination  of
interest  rate controls,  credit ceilings,  sectoral allocation  of credit, and non-competitive  access  of the public
sector to bank credit are among  the main features of financial  sector reform. Even if such a reform does
not increase  total resources for investment, 2' it could contribute  significantly  to the efficiency  of financial
intermediation,  resource allocation, and hence to growth.
3.  Public infrastructure,  transport and communication  networks  are essential factors contributing  to
the provision of goods and services by the private sector.  Not surprisingly, the scarcity and frequent
underpricing of  these services affect negatively private investmnent  in  Morocco.  Therefore fiscal
"Private saving in Morocco is insensitive  to interest rates, as the results in a related paper
suggest (Schmidt-Hebbel  and Muller, 1990).- 31 -
budgeting  should  program the required  resources for significant  improvements  in the quantity and quality
of public fixed capital, the latter achieved  by a systematic  evaluation  of public sector projects.
4.  Terms of trade gains and losses tend to be reflected by movements in investment  rates.  This
procyclical behavior of investment  rates could be dampened by a commodity  export price or returns
management  policy for major export commodities  (phosphates),  insulating  domestic  absorption  from ex-
ante perceived  transitory price shocks by making  use of a special stabilization  fund.
5.  Morocco's high foreign debt increases  uncertainty  perceived  by domestic investors. A prudent
and consistent  debt transformation  and servicing  policy could  overcome in the medium term the negative
disincentive effects of the debt on private investment.  A debt and debt service reduction agreement
between Morocco and its commercial  creditors  would help considerably  to reduce uncertainty  stemming
from the debt overhang.
6.  Finally, foreign investment faces multiple barriers in Morocco, most of them related to the
Moroccanization  law of  1973.  A reform of this law would generate a powerful incentive for foreign
investment inflows, which cculd constitute important complementary  sources of financing for highly
indebted countries, like Morocco, which face stringent foreign resource constraints.- 32 -
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Three major problems  arise in deriving time series for private investment  in Morocco. First, no
consistent  time series are available for public enterprise investment. As private sector investment  has to
be derived residually by deducting  public sector figures from investment  from domestic investment,  the
en-eipfini  nrivate  Rector  includes  public  entemrises. -fThuq  total sroq.s  domestic  investment  (and national
saving) could only be broken down into two categories:  general government 2'  and private sector
(including public enterprises).  In this papers, the words public and private refer to this particular
breakdown.
2'General government is defined as the aggregate  of the central government (budget  general,
budgets annexes, comptes sp6ciaux  du tresor), local administrations,  public non profit organizations
(e.g. universities, hospitals), and the social security system.- 34 -
Second, investment  deflators are not published  for Morocco  and therefore had to be estimated.
For that purpose, we chose separate deflators for the two main investment categories (essentially
machinery  and equipment,  and construction). Because  of the different  composition  of private and public
investment,  their deflators do not follow the same evolution.
Third, it is difficult  to reconcile  government  data coming  from different sources, i.e. the national
accounts and the budget.  Fixed capital formation of the government is only published in the national
accounts,  where it is defined  for general government. The series for the government  deficit comes from
budget data, thus including only central government. Therefore, general government saving had to be
estimated  using an ad hoc assumption  on the deficit of local governments  and social security.
Some comments  on the methodological  problems related  to the first two problems  follow.
(i)  On Public and Private Investment
The analysis  of private investment  in the eighties,  however, and the identification  of the variables
which affect private investment  behavior  in Morocco  are not affected  significantly  by these shortcomings
in data availability. The conclusions  presented  in this paper would  be affected  only if the following  three
conditions  were simultaneously  met.  First, the share of public enterprise investment  in non-government
investment  is large.  Second, the share of public enterprise investment  in non-government  investment
varies widely over time.  Third, the behavior of most public enterprises with respect to investment
decisions  is different from private enterprises' behavior.
From the limited information  available, it can be asserted  that these three conditions  are not met
simultaneously. First, the share of public enterprise investment  in total non-government  investment  is
not large; according to the only data available it was 28% for the period 1980-82.  Second, partial
information  on major public enterprises  (ONE, ONEP, ONCF, ONPT) indicates  that their share in non-
government investment  has probably decreased from about 11% in 1982 to 6-7% in 1987, and picked
up to 10% in 1988. These variations do not seem to be significant  enough to change the conclusions  of
the analysis. Finally, an important number of public enterprises, such as OCP and RAM, make their
investment  decisions  on the basis of market signals or constraints, even if some of them behave in a
In the absence  of complete  data, an important  question  remains: Can "strictly  private" in /estment
have increased between 1982 and 1988 as a share of GDP, while non-government  (public and private
enterprise) investment  fell? For the decline in private investment  not to have happened, non-government
investment  would have had to fall by very large amounts  between 1982 and 1988.  For strictly private
investment  to remain constant as a share of GDP (in real terms) during 1982-88, public e.,cerprise  (PE)
investment  would have had to fall in real terms from 4.8% of GDP in 1982  to 1.0% of GDP in 1986-88.
This means that the level of PE investment  at current prices would have had to fall from 5.1 billion
Dirhams in 1982 to 2.2 billion dirhams in 1988.  It appears that the investment  of four major public
enterprises (ONE, ONEP, ONCF, ONPT) in 1988  already amounts  to 2.9 billion dirhams.  For private
investment  to increase as a share of GDP (in real terms) the fall in public enterprise investment  would
have had to be even more dramatic.  We assume implicitly in our analysis that the relative shares of
private investment  and PE investment  remained constant  within total non-government  investment  since
1982. That would still imply a fall in the ratio of public enterprise investment  to GDP (in real terms),
from 4.8% in 1982 to 3.7% in 1988.- 35.-
(ii)  QOnInvestment  Deflators
Total (and government) fixed capital formation appears in the Moroccan  national accounts by
sectors of origin that can be aggregated  into machinery  and equipment,  buildings, and agriculture. For
each of these categories, separate price inidices  have been estimated. The investment  deflators are then
calculated  as weighted averages  of the individual  price indices.
The price index  for machinery  and equipment  is a weighted  average of a price index  for imported
capital goods (the unit value ot  manutactured exports by the G-5 to developing countries, MUV,
converted into DRH) and a deflator for domestic  value added  of the manufacturing  sector. We assumed
weights of .8 for the former and .2 for the latter.
For buildings, as well as for agriculture,  deflators are taken from the national accounts.
APPENDIX B: THE REAL USER COST OF CAPITAL
This Appendix has been adapted from a note by Faini and Pigato (1989).  The latter calculates
the nominal user cost of capital, whereas we use the real user cost in the regressions.
The cost of capital in Morocco has been greatly affected by a complex system of investment
incentives  and tax provisions aimed at redressing regional imbalances. Three zones are distinguished:
(a) the Casablanca  area (zone 1); (b) the Fez area (zone  2); and (c) the Tanger area (zone  3).  In the 1983
Investment  Code, the Fez and Tanger areas have been aggregated  together.  The three areas cover the
quasi totality of the investment  expenditures  approved under the code.  The Codes distinguish  between
extension and creation investments.  The following discussion focuses on the impact of the incentive
decisions in new plants only.
The 1973 Code.  Its main provisions were:  (a) custom duty and indirect tax exemption on
imports  of investment  and intermediate  goods; (b) 50% corporate tax exemption  in Zone 2 and 3 and
accelerated depreciation allowances in Zone 1 for new firms.  For existing firms, the corporate tax
exemption  is grant'  for a ten year period starting from their creation  date; (c) five year exemption  on
the patent tax (basically  a capital levy); and d) 2% interest rate rebates on BNDE loans.
Ih  1283  Code. Its main provisions  are:  (a) custom  duty and indirect  tax exemption  on imports
of investment and intermediate goods.  The exemption  is fairly general.  Only new firms which are
located  in the Casablanca  area are  not entitled  to it- (h) a ISM9  CnmAnrtp  ta  pYeamntinn  fer  in "z^n
2 and 3; (c) accelerated  depreciation  allowances  are abolished;  and (d) interest rate rebates are eliminated
for firms located in zone 1.
Tle  1982 C9d.  Its main provisions are:  new firms which are located in zones 2 and 3 may
choose between: (a) a 50% corporate tax exemption; and (b) accelerated  depreciation  allowances  equal
to twice the value normally allowed  to new firms.
Tlhe  Real User Cost of Capital
If interest payments  are fully tax-deductible,  as in the Moroccan  context, the user cost of capital
(wick)  is enual to-
(B.1)  utk  =  q(r(l-t)  + d  - lp- 36 -
where q is the price of investment  goods, r is the lending interest ratu, t is the corporate tax rate, d is
the depreciation  rate, 7r' is the expected inflation  of the investment  goods price q, and p is the GDP
deflator.
The value of q ;las been computed taking into account the whole system of fiscal and financial
incentives.
Therefore
(B.2)  q  =  qm(1 -ts) / (I -t)
where  qm is the market price of investment  goods, and ts is the present discounted value of
present and future tax savings  from fiscal depreciation  allowances. With linear depreciation  allowances
ts is equal to:
(B.  3)  ts  =  tl/I  T[l  - (I1/1 + r (I-t)  )*71 *1 r (I-t)  I/r(1-t)
where T is the relevant  capital goods life length.
Two  investment sectors are considered:  construction and  equipment. T is  20  (10) for
construction  (equipment)  under normal  depreciation  schedules. With accelerated  depreciation,  the values
of T are 50% lower.
The lending rate charged  by BNDE  has been used in the empirical  implementation  of the model.
Thus,
(B.4)  r  =  (rl  - reb)* (1  + tps)
where  rl i; the nominal BNDE lending rate, reb is the 2% rehateP  allowed in zones 1 and 2 from 1973
to 1986  and in zone 3 from 1973  to 1982, and tps is the tax 'sur les provisions  et services", a patent tax;
this tax rate has been equal to 12% throughout  the period.
A uniform  value of 5% has been assumed  for the rate of depreciation. A basic value of 48% has
been used for the corporate tax rate.  This rate has been increased  by the PSN tax (a National Solidarity
tax) atter 19i5 and allowance  has been made for the various tax holidays in zones 2 and 3.
Finally, the deflator of private fixed investment  has been used as the price of investment  goods.
Expectations  on future inflation are assumed to be a simple average of static expectations  and perfect
foresight.
(B.5)  ic  =  (1/2)  (q/q_l  - 1)  + (1/2)  (q4llq  - 1)
Three indices  of the cost of capital, one for each zone are calculated.  Then they are aggregated,
using 1980 weights, to yield the final estimate  of the real user cost of capita! p7resented  in Appendix  C.
The user cost of capital for machinery  and equipment  UCKM (and for buildings  UCKB) is calculated
similarly  to UCK, using the deflator for machinery  and equipment  (buildings)  for p.- 37 -
APPENDIX  C:  MOROCCO  DATA SERIES (1970-1988)
Table C.1
SAVING-TNVESTMENT  RALANL  F.
(% of GDP, at current prices)
Private  General  Changes  Gross  Private  General  Current  Total
FCF  Government  in  Domestic  Saving  Government  Account  Saving
FCF  Stocks  Investment  Saving  Deficit
1970  10.6  5.2  4.6  20.4  15.7  1.7  3.0  20.4
1971  10.1  5.6  4.0  19.7  15.6  2.7  1.3  19.7
1972  9.5  4.8  2.2  16.5  16.4  1.0  -0.9  16.5
1973  10.3  3.9  4.3  18.6  18.2  2.0  -1.6  18.6
1974  11.8  3.7  7.7  23.2  26.1  0.0  -2.9  23.2
1975  17.5  8.7  0.5  26.6  21.2  -0.4  5.8  26.6
1976  20.6  10.7  -2.0  29.2  21.8  -6.4  13.8  29.2
1977  22.4  11.3  3.0  36.6  24.7  -3.7  15.7  36.6
1978  19.8  6.5  0.7  26.9  21.3  4.0  9.6  26.9
1979  17.4  7.8  0.7  25.9  18.6  -1.8  9.1  25.9
1980  16.7  5.5  2.0  24.2  21.2  -4.5  7.5  24.2
1981  18.5  7.5  0.2  26.1  20.8  -6.9  12.2  26.1
1982  19.7  7.6  0.9  28.2  20.7  -4.8  12.3  28.2
1983  18.5  6.0  -0.5  24.0  22.8  -6.1  73  24.0
1984  18.3  4.8  2.2&  25.3  22.4  -6.4  9.3  25.3
1985  17.8  5.4  4.0  27.1  23.2  -4.3  8.2  27.1
1986  16.5  4.9  3.1  24.5  22.4  -0.5  2.5  24.5
1987  MU.I  4.0  2.6  22.6  23.2  -l.  I  1.1  22.6
1988  16.3  4.1  3.3  23.6  23.9  -0.1  -0.2  23.6
Sources:
The data on fixed-capital  formation (FCF) and changes in stocks are from National Accounts.
General government  saving is calculated  as the sum of central government  overall balance, before debt
relief (from Treasury sources) and its FCF.  The current account  deficit (before debt relief) is from the
Balance  of Payments. Finally, private saving is obtained  residually.- 38 -
Table C.2
PRIVATE  FIXED-CAPITAL  INVESTMENT  BY SECTOR  OF ORIGIN
(% of GDP, at constant 1980  prices)
Machinery  Buildings  Public  Other  Private
and Equipment  Work:  Fixed-Capital
Investment
1970  6.1  3.5  3.3  0.8  13.7
1971  5.4  4.1  3.0  0.7  13.3
1972  5.2  3.9  2.9  0.8  12.9
1973  5.9  4.2  2.5  0.8  13.4
1974  7.8  4.1  2.7  0.8  15.3
1975  11.0  6.0  5.0  0.5  22.6
1976  11.7  6.7  5.2  0.5  24.1
1977  12.9  6.4  4.7  0.4  24.4
1978  9.6  7.3  3.3  0.5  20.6
1979  8.4  6.1  2.9  0.4  17.7
1980  7.3  5.7  2.8  0.9  16.7
1981  6.8  6.0  3.2  0.7  16.8
1982  7.8  5.5  3.2  0.6  17.1
1983  5.5  5.5  3.4  0.6  14.9
1984  5.6  4.9  3.0  0.7  14.2
1985  5.3  4.7  3.0  0.7  13.7
1986  5.3  4.4  2.8  0.8  13.3
1987  5.0  4.9  2.6  0.9  13.4
1988  4.7  5.3  2.6  0.7  13.3
Sourc:  National Accounts and World Bank estimates  for deflators.- 39 -
Table C.3
REAL USER COST OF CAPITAL  AND ITS MOVING  VARIANCE
V-CLK  UCKM  UCKB  VUC  VUCEM  VUCKB
1970  8.5%  8.4%  9.5%  0.0008  0.0021  0.0009
1971  8.7%  8.9%  9.3%  0.0011  0.0151  0.0063
1972  8.8%  11.8%  8.1%  0.0512  0.0536  0.0536
1973  -2.1%  -0.7%  -2.6%  0.0481  0.0623  0.0451
1974  -0.5%  -2.0%  0.4%  0.0326  0.0328  0.0324
1975  5.4%  5.5%  5.3%  0.0349  0.0306  0.0557
1976  -2.8%  1.5%  -8.2%  0.0432  0.0195  0.0774
1977  -4.4%  1.3%  -13.0%  0.0276  0.0190  0.0395
1978  2.1%  5.4%  -3.3%  0.0337  0.0170  0.0652
1979  3.3%  3.2%  2.8%  0.0293  0.0633  0.0252
1980  -3.5%  -9.0%  -0.2%  0.0318  0.0585  0.0136
1981  -3.5%  -9.4%  0.1%  0.0219  0.0343  0.0247
1982  -8.1%  -16.5%  -5.3%  0.0244  0.0511  0.0233
1983  -9.1%  -21.9%  -4.3%  0.0686  0.1000  0.0667
1984  5.9%  1.5%  9.4%  0.0930  0.1376  0.0802
1985  13.3%  10.8%  14.8%  0.0782  0.1073  0.0593
1986  24.9%  27.4%  23.7%  0.0558  0.08 1  0.0398
1987  25.3%  29.2%  22.6%  0.0165  0.0144  0.0168
1988  21.6%  25.7%  19.8%  0.0173  0.0166  0.0135
Definitions  and Sources:
UCK  Real user cost of capital for total private investmnent. See Appendix B for a  dewaikd
description.
UCKM  Real user cost of capital for investment  in machinery  and equipment.
UCKB  Real user cost of capital for investment  in buildings.
VUCK  Moving variance of the real user cost of capital for total private investment.  Variance
calculated  over three periods (ast,  present, next).
VUCICFM  Idem, for investmnent  in machinery and equipment.
VUCKB  Idem, for investment  in buildings.- 40-
Table CA
Other Determinants of Private Investment
(%)
Y/YT  FC/Y  TT/Y  ND/Y  KG/Y  D/Y
1970  100.6  14.3  -0.57  0.50  49.6  17.7
1971  101.4  13.8  -0.18  0.72  52.4  19.9
1972  099.1  15.0  -0.79  -0.03  57.4  21.7
1973  98.0  15.7  -0.36  -0.26  60.7  20.4
1974  96.8  14.1  3.22  1.36  62.3  18.7
1975  99.3  16.8  4.20  1.42  61.1  17.2
1976  106.2  19.1  0.19  1.58  64.1  19.1
1977  108.7  19.0  -0.73  5.2  70.9  25.5
1978  106.1  21.1  -0.98  3.10  79.9  40.2
1979  106.1  21.4  0.35  3.11  80.3  43.2
1980  105.0  21.3  0.00  1.25  82.7  50.0
1981  97.4  22.5  -0.98  0.28  88.2  53.6
1982  102.0  22.6  -1.58  2.63  84.4  53.8
1983  96.8  24.6  -1.62  1.21  89.3  63.3
1984  96.4  24.8  -1.74  1.59  87.9  66.0
1985  97.9  24.7  -1.57  1.25  84.0  67.6
_~~~~-  ^  ^  4  r  sr  e  n  It  a  7 1986  IU.o3  2.  -. 13  i.v  722  .9
1987  94.1  24.9  0.58  0.80  83.2  71.0
1988  99.2  23.7  1.10  0.45  76.3  66.7
vnMM  Doti^ Afeurrent to trend real GDP (Source  of current  GDP: National  Accounts). Trend GDP (YI) is defined  as  the fited sefies
of the deteurinisds trend regression; Y =a  cxp(bt),  where t is dme, and  a, b are  coefficients.
FC/Y  Ratio of firm credit to GDP. FC is total short, medium  and  long termn  credit extended  by deposit  banks and pecialzed financial
institutions  to fimrm  (Soure:  Anumal  Reports, Bank  al Maghib).
TF/Y  Ratio of the Terns of Trde  Adjustment  to real GDP. Tr  is defined  as the difference  between  nominll exports  of GNFS CXN)
deflated by the impon deflator  nd exports at consant prices:  XN/PM - XN/PX - XR (PX/PM-1). (Souce:  National
Accounts).
ND/Y  Ratio of net foreign  disbursements  to private  and Public  enterprises  (of Public and  publicly  guaranteed  debt) to GDP.  (Soutce:
DRS, World Bank).
KG/Y  Ratio of general government  capital  tock to GDP.  KG is calculated  by cumulating ra  investment,  asuming an initial
government  capital  to GDP rtio  of .5 in 1968  and a  depreciation  rate of 3 % per aanum (Source: National  Accounts).
DIY  Ratio of external  debt to GODP  at consat  prices and constnt exchnge rate  D is total extnl  medium  and  long term debt,
including IMF  (Source: DRS,  World Bank).PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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